The State of Utah v. Michael C. Martin : Reply Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2007
The State of Utah v. Michael C. Martin : Reply Brief
of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joanne C. Slotnik; Assistant Attorney General; Mark Shurtleff; Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Linda M. Jones; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorney for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Martin, No. 20070426 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/275
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
MICHAEL C. MARTIN, : Case No. 20070426-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for criminal mischief, a class A 
misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-106 (2003) and 76-3-402(1) (Supp 2006), 
entered in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Deno Himonas, presiding. 
LINDA M. JONES (5497) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK (4414) 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MARIC SHURTLEFF (4666) 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Hcber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Attorneys for Appellee 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
MICHAEL C. MARTIN, : Case No. 20070426-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for criminal mischief, a class A 
misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-106 (2003) and 76-3-402(1) (Supp 2006), 
entered in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Flonorable Deno Himonas, presiding. 
LINDA M. JONES (5497) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK (4414) 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MARK SHURTLEFF (4666) 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Hcber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Attorneys for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF ATHORITIES ii 
ARGUMENT 1 
POINT I. THE STATE'S BRIEF ON JURISDICTION 
DISREGARDS THE LAW 1 
POINT II. THE STATE RELIES ON SUBSEQUENT 
HEARINGS TO CLAIM THAT MARTIN VIOLATED 
THE PLEA AGREEMENT. YET THE SUBSEQUENT 
PROCEEDINGS ARE IRRELEVANT 5 
CONCLUSION 10 
I 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Cases 
InreAltro, 180 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1999) 6, 8 
State v. Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, 60 P.3d 582 6, 8, 9, 10 
State v Gamer, 2005 UT 6, 106 P.3d 729 3, 4, 5 
State v Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987) 6, 8 
State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117, 69 P.3d 838 6, 8, 10 
State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, 84 P.3d 854 4 
United States v. Bums, 160 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 1998) 5, 6 
United States v. Franco-Lopez, 312 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2002) 6, 8 
United States v. Jefferies, 908 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir. 1990) 6, 8, 10 
Rules 
Utah R. App. P. 3 (2008) 3 
Utah R. App. P. 4 (2008) 3 
Utah R. App. P. 22 (2008) 3 
Utah R. App. P. 24 (2008) 1 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-l (2003) 6, 8 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-2 (2003) 6, 7, 10 
Other Authorities 
17AAm. Jur. 2d Contracts § 31 (1991) 9 
ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
MICHAEL C. MARTIN, : Case No. 20070426-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Pursuant to this Court's directive, Defendant/Appellant Michael Martin has 
addressed the Court's jurisdiction on appeal, and he has raised an issue concerning the 
plea-in-abeyance agreement. (Br. of Appellant, dated May 14, 2008). Now he files this 
reply brief to answer matters set forth in the State's brief. See_ Utah R. App. P. 24(c) 
(2008). The issues before this Court may be decided on the record and existing law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE STATE'S BRIEF ON JURISDICTION DISREGARDS THE 
LAW. 
In papers filed with this Court, the State originally agreed that the Court had 
jurisdiction over Martin's appeal. (See "State's Response to Sua Sponte Motion for 
Summary Disposition/' dated August 275 2007). 
Indeed, according to the record, on April 20, 2007, the trial court entered a 
judgment of conviction on two counts. (R. 131-33). The judgment for count one was in 
error since the parties had agreed in September 2005 to dismiss that count. (See, e.g., R. 
51-58 (reflecting September 2005 agreement to dismiss count one)). The judgment for 
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count two was for "Criminal Mischief- Class A Misdemeanor." (R. 131-33). When the 
trial court realized its error in the judgment as it related to count one, it issued a post-
judgment Memorandum Decision. (R. 136-39 (dated May 8, 2007)). The Memorandum 
Decision addressed the April 20th judgment in three respects. 
First, it vacated the sentence and conviction on count one. (R. 138). The State 
does not dispute that point. It has recognized in its brief on appeal that nothing more is 
necessary to resolve count one. (See, e.g., Br. of Appellee, 12). Thus, count one is fully 
and finally concluded. 
Second, the Memorandum Decision reiterated that the trial court intended to enter 
a judgment of conviction for a class A misdemeanor offense on count two. (R. 138). Yet 
the April 20th judgment already supported a conviction on that count. (See R. 131-32 
(entry of judgment and conviction for criminal mischief, a class A misdemeanor on count 
two); 138 (Memorandum Decision for criminal mischief, a class A misdemeanor on 
count two)). 
Thus, the Memorandum Decision did not change the substance or character of the 
original judgment for count two. The State does not dispute that point. In fact, the State 
asserts that "[t]he signed sentence, judgment, and commitment of April 20th plainly 
documents count [two] as a class A misdemeanor with a suspended 365-day jail term. 
Moreover, the court had already explained both its intent and rationale for the reduction 
at the March 9th hearing. The clarification that the court offered in its May 8th 
memorandum decision was thus mere surplusage. It did not add, subtract, or even clarify 
what was already plainly on the record" (Br. of Appellee, 10) (emphasis added; internal 
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cites omitted). That is correct: the trial court's Memorandum Decision had no effect on 
the conviction for count two and the suspended jail sentence with probation. (See Br. of 
Appellee, 10). 
That portion of the Memorandum Decision is treated as a nunc pro tunc entry. See 
State v. Garner, 2005 UT 6, Tf 11, 106 P.3d 729. It relates back to the date of the original 
April 20th judgment of conviction on count two. See, id_ (stating when a later order does 
not change the substance or character of the original judgment, it is "merely a nunc pro 
tunc entry which relates back to the time the original judgment was entered") (cite 
omitted); (see also R. 131-33). Thus, under the circumstances, Martin was required to 
perfect his appeal by filing a notice of appeal on or before Monday, May 21, 2007. See 
Utah R. App. P. 3, 4, 22 (2008) (requiring appeal to be perfected within 30 days of 
judgment). He did that. (See R. 141 (notice, dated May 21, 2007)). His appeal was 
timely. (See Brief of Appellant, Argument, Point LB.). 
Notwithstanding Martin's filing, the State seems to claim that this Court lacks 
jurisdiction over the appeal because of the third issue addressed in the Memorandum 
Decision: restitution. (See Br. of Appellee, 12). Specifically, in the Memorandum 
Decision, the trial court ruled that on April 20th it neglected to consider statutory factors 
under the restitution act. (R. 138-39). Thus, it entered the Memorandum Decision to 
reopen proceedings on that issue. (Id.) 
Under Utah law, a trial court may address and resolve the issue of restitution after 
entry of the original judgment of conviction. The Utah Supreme Court ruled, "[W]here 
orders for restitution remain open to be decided at a later date, the subsequent entry of the 
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amount of restitution is not a new and final judgment for purposes of appealing the 
underlying merits of a criminal conviction." Garner, 2005 UT 6, | 17. Accordingly, if 
the issue of restitution is reopened for consideration at a later date - as happened here 
with the Memorandum Decision (R. 138-39) - that does not affect the time for filing an 
appeal. Garner, 2005 UT 6, If 17. Stated another way, the appeal from the judgment of 
conviction will not wait for finality on restitution. I(L at fflf 15-17. Consequently, if a 
defendant delays in filing the notice of appeal until after the trial court has addressed 
restitution in sentencing, the appeal will be too late. See, e.g., id. at^f 1-6, 15-17. 
In earlier papers filed with this Court, the State agreed with the supreme court's 
ruling in Garner. It stated, 
[T]he district judge lacked jurisdiction to set aside a valid sentence at that point, 
and his anticipated review of the restitution issue did not affect the finality of the 
judgment and sentence for purposes of appeal. Before considering the restitution 
issue, the district court judge had corrected the sentencing errors, leaving a valid 
conviction and sentence for a class A misdemeanor. 
("State's Response to Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition," at 7 (citing Garner, 
2005 UT 6, Tj 17; State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, ^ 10, 84 P.3d 854 (upon 
imposition of a valid sentence, the court loses subject matter jurisdiction over the case))). 
Now on appeal, the State has reversed its position. It maintains this Court should 
deny jurisdiction over the appeal and remand the case to the trial court to "consider resti-
tution, as mandated by the Crime Victims Restitution Act. When the district court enters 
its amended final judgment, sentence, and commitment, defendant's time for filing an 
appeal will commence." (Br. of Appellee, 12). The State's argument is contrary to 
Garner. Indeed, it makes no mention of Garner in its treatment of the issue. (Id.) 
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The State's new argument should be rejected. The trial court's reference in the 
Memorandum Decision to restitution "does not affect" the finality of the conviction and 
judgment for purposes of appeal. (See "State's Response to Sua Sponte Motion for 
Summary Disposition," at 5 (citing Garner, 2005 UT 6, f 17)). Thus, where Martin filed 
a notice of appeal within 30 days from the original judgment of conviction on the class A 
misdemeanor offense, the appeal from the conviction is timely and proper. 
POINT II. THE STATE RELIES ON SUBSEQUENT HEARINGS TO 
CLAIM THAT MARTIN VIOLATED THE PLEA AGREEMENT. YET 
THE SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS ARE IRRELEVANT. 
In September 2005, Martin and the State entered into a plea-in-abeyance agree-
ment, whereby Martin agreed to replace a fence and foliage in his neighbor's yard, and he 
agreed "to have the work done by a licensed third party." (R. 55; 51-58). In July 2006, 
the State filed an order to show cause, alleging Martin was in violation of the agreement. 
(R. 108-110). Thereafter, the trial court held a hearing on the matter. (R. 197). 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that Martin violated the 
agreement because he assisted the third-party contractor in doing the work, and he was 
not supervised at all times. (See R. 197:55-56). Martin maintains on appeal that the plea-
in-abeyance agreement was not so restrictive as to prohibit him from assisting with the 
work and it did not require that all work be done exclusively and solely by the third-party 
contractor. (See Br. of Appellant, Argument, Point II.) Thus, based on this record he did 
not violate the terms of the agreement. 
Under the law for plea-in-abeyance agreements, a trial court must ensure that the 
terms and conditions are explicit and unambiguous. See_ United States v. Burns, 160 F.3d 
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825 83 (1st Cir. 1998) (recognizing that significant terms should be stated "explicitly and 
unambiguously" in the agreement to preclude subsequent circumvention); see also State 
v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117, \ 19, 69 P.3d 838 (stating "'[a]ny omissions or ambiguities 
in the affidavit must be clarified during the plea hearing, as must any uncertainties raised 
in the course of the plea colloquy'") (cite omitted). They must be detailed and in writing. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-2a-2(4) (setting forth requirements for plea-in-abeyance agree-
ment); 77-2a-l(l) (2003) (indicating conditions are "as set forth" in the plea agreement). 
If the trial court intends the agreement to be restrictive, the court must specify the 
terms at the time of the plea hearing. See, e.g., id_ at §§ 77-2a-2(4) (requiring "full, 
detailed recitation" of requirements and conditions of the agreement), 77-2a-l (defining 
plea-in-abeyance agreement to set forth "specific terms and conditions"). If the 
agreement fails to set out the restrictive terms, such terms may not be imposed against the 
defendant after the fact. See, e.g. State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987) 
(stating "Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that 
constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is 
entered") (emphasis added). In addition, if the terms are ambiguous, they must be 
construed against the government and in favor of the defendant. See, e.g., United States 
v. Jefferies, 908 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Franco-Lopez, 312 
F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir. 2002); InreAltro, 180 F.3d 372, 375 (2d Cir. 1999). If the terms 
are reasonably disputed and the record fails to support a meeting of the minds, the parties 
may be put back into their original pre-plea positions. See, e.g., State v. Bickley, 2002 
UT App 342, ffif 15-16, 60 P.3d 582. 
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The State does not dispute the law on plea-in-abeyance agreements as set forth in 
Martin's brief. (See Br. of Appellee, Argument II.; see also Br. of Appellant, Argument, 
Point II.) Likewise, it does not dispute that the trial court found Martin to be in violation 
of the agreement on the grounds that he assisted the third-party contractor with the work. 
However, the State claims the trial court was correct in that ruling because Martin "was 
not to have any part in completing the repair work." (Br. of Appellee, 17). 
Yet in connection with its claim, the State has looked not to the plea agreement 
but chiefly to subsequent hearings in the trial court in January 2006, February 2006 and 
January 2007 (Br. of Appellee, 14, 16, 17); and letters from the complaining neighbor, 
Kathryn Randazzo, filed after the plea hearing (id., 16). The State relies on the 
subsequent proceedings as a "key to understanding" the trial court's ruling. (Br. of 
Appellee, 14 (citing to January 2007 hearing)). 
Those proceedings are irrelevant. They do not shed light on the meaning of the 
phrase - "to have the work done by a licensed third party" (see R. 55; 188:13; see also 
R. 63 (letter from defendant stating that he was to hire a contractor to do the work)) - as 
set forth in the actual agreement, particularly where Martin maintains the agreement did 
not prohibit him from assisting with the work. (Br. of Appellant, Argument, Point II.B.) 
Indeed, the subsequent proceedings show only that the trial court sought to construe the 
agreement months after the plea hearing. That was improper for the following reasons. 
First, the subsequent proceedings are not an adequate substitute for setting forth "a 
full, detailed recitation of the requirements and conditions" of the agreement at the time 
of the plea, as required by law. Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-2(4) (setting forth requirements 
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for plea-in-abeyance agreement); id_ at § 77-2a-l(l) (indicating conditions are "as set 
forth" in the plea-in-abeyance agreement); see also Mora, 2003 UT App 117, U 19 
(requiring ambiguities to be clarified at the plea hearing) (cite omitted); Bickley, 2002 UT 
App 342, Tf 16 (recognizing that trial court should make sure parties understand terms 
"before acting upon the [plea] agreement") (cite omitted). In other words, to the extent 
the trial court used subsequent hearings in this case to clarify the original plea-in-
abeyance agreement, that would be improper unless the trial court expressly afforded the 
defendant a meaningful opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea. An after-the-fact 
interpretation would not adequately protect a defendant who has already waived 
constitutional rights to plead guilty to a criminal offense. See, e.g.. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 
1312 (requiring trial court to ensure constitutional requirements are met when the plea 
agreement is entered); Jefferies, 908 F.2d at 1523 (stating ambiguities in the agreement 
"must be read against the government"; the rationale for this requirement is that the 
agreement must adequately warn the defendant of the consequences of the plea). 
Second, to the extent the trial court's subsequent hearings clarified the agreement, 
any clarification was required to be against the government and in favor of the defendant. 
See, e.g., Jefferies, 908 F.2d at 1523; Franco-Lopez, 312 F.3d at 989; InreAltro, 180 
F.3d at 375. Since the trial court failed to construe the agreement in that fashion, it erred. 
(See Br. of Appellant, Argument, Point II.B.(l)). 
In the alternative, where the agreement needed clarification because it was 
susceptible to differing interpretations by the parties, the agreement itself was in error. 
See Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, ffif 11-12 (reflecting that the State interpreted "total 
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victim restitution" to mean complete restitution, while defendant contended it meant 
restitution for charged years). Indeed, the different interpretations support "no meeting of 
the minds." Id_ at ^ 15 (recognizing no meeting of the minds as to what "total victim 
restitution" meant) (citing inter alia, 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 31 (1991) ("Where 
after the parties have apparently agreed to the terms of a contract, circumstances 
disclosed a latent ambiguity in the meaning of an essential word by which one of the 
parties meant one thing and the other a different thing, the difference going to the essence 
of the supposed contract, the result is that there is no contract.") (footnote omitted)); (see 
also Br. of Appellant, Argument, Point II.B.(2)). Thus, the matter may be "'corrected by 
placing the parties in their original positions. As long as the defendant retains 
constitutional protections, no harm need be suffered.'" Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, j^ 16 
(cite omitted). 
In short, in this case, the plea-in-abeyance agreement required Martin to do repair 
work to his neighbor's yard and fence, and "to have the work done by a licensed third 
party." (R. 55; 188:13). The agreement did not prohibit Martin from assisting with the 
work. (See R. 55; 188:13). Rather, it provided a level of professionalism by requiring a 
third-party licensed contractor, and it served to accommodate Ms. Randazzo so that she 
would not have to interact directly with Martin. (See R. 188:13 (identifying animosity 
between Martin and Ms. Randazzo)). In addition, since Martin used the third-party 
contractor to do work, he was able to assist without being on Ms. Randazzo's property. 
(See R. 9 (reflecting no-contact order); 188:13 (identifying animosity "with [Martin] 
personally being there"); 55 (requiring licensed third party)). 
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In this case, Martin did the work in compliance with the agreement: he hired a 
third-party licensed electrician "slash handyman," Evan Lee. (R. 197:47, 48, 51; 
Defendant's Exhibits 5, 7). Martin assisted Lee when needed and was able to do so 
without trespassing onto Ms. Randazzo's property; he poured concrete to secure the posts 
and design of the fence. (R. 197:49-51, 52-53; also R. 197:32-33 (Poppleton saw Martin 
working on corner end posts)). Also, while Martin acknowledged that Lee was not 
always present, Lee did most of the work and was there "[t]he majority of the time." (R. 
197:50, 55). 
Based on the record, the trial court erred when it ruled that Martin violated the 
terms and conditions of the agreement. (Compare R. 197:55-56 (trial court ruling); with 
R. 55 (plea agreement)); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-2(4)(a) (requiring the plea 
agreement to include "a full, detailed recitation" of requirements and conditions); Mora, 
2003 UT App 117, If 19 (requiring ambiguities to be clarified at the plea hearing); 
Jefferies, 908 F.2d at 1523 (construing ambiguities against the government). Thus, this 
Court may order reinstatement of the agreement. In the alternative, it may allow the 
parties to return to their pre-plea positions under Bickley, 2002 UT App 342. 
CONCLUSION 
Martin respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court ruling since he 
was not in violation of the plea agreement. This Court may order reinstatement of the 
agreement or it may order that the parties be returned to their pre-plea positions. 
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SUBMITTED this /ft day of Sepj'.&w k-er , 2008. 
^i/d?^l^Ch-
Liritia M. Jones n 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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